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Output Quotas and Strategic Interaction in Processed Food Markets 
Abstract 
This paper considers the impact of output quotas on food processors for different 
specifications of duopoly behavior. For a restriction on one firm, rents are shifted to the 
other under quantity competition while both benefit under price competition. For quotas 
on both firms, each benefits whatever the nature of competition. 
Introduction 
In the past decade, agricultural economists have treated the food and agricultural sectors 
as being part of a series of vertically interrelated input-output markets known collectively 
as the 'food chain' (see, Burns et al, 1983 and Connor et al, 1985). In analyzing this 
economic system, it is important to recognize the existence of two forms of market 
interdependence. On the one hand, there is horizontal competition within any given sector 
and, on the other hand, there are important vertical links between the sectors. Whilst a 
good deal of progress has been made in understanding the competitive process within 
different parts of the food chain, agricultural economics has yet to explore, in any great 
detail, the ways in which horizontal market interdependencies can interact with vertical 
market interdependencies. A priori, these relationships become critical in analyzing the 
impact of government policy on the food chain, in particular the effects of agricultural and 
food policy. Government intervention in either or both of the agricultural and food 
manufacturing sectors may affect the distribution of economic welfare between them and 
also consumers. 
The aim of this paper is to explore, in a theoretical manner, the effects of strategic 
interaction in the food industries on the outcomes of government intervention designed to 
affect the agricultural sector. A distinction can be made between indirect and direct 
agricultural policies that affect food manufacturing. The former relate to policies such as 
agricultural support prices and import tariffs which raise input costs to food processors. The 
latter relate to policies such as output quotas that are imposed directly on food processors 
as a means of restricting agricultural output. Such policies have been used in the European 
Community (EC) sugar processing sector. 
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• The outline of the paper is as follows: in Section 1, a simple model of duopoly is set 
up in order to characterize equilibria between a firm processing a domestically produced 
agricultural commodity and a firm processing an imported agricultural commodity. Section 
2 considers the effects of direct agricultural policies in the form of output quotas. If a quota 
is placed on only one of the two food processors, it is shown that such a policy can have 
quite different effects, depending on the underlying game being played by the two firms. 
However, when quotas are placed on both firms, they act like capacity constraints such that, 
following Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), the equilibrium of a game in price will be the same 
as that in quantities. Finally, in Section 3, the results of this analysis are summarized. 
1. Duopoly Equilibrium 
In this section, a simple model of duopoly in food processing is set up. It is assumed that 
the relevant food processing industry comprises two firms who are first-stage food 
processors. Firm 1 converts a domestically produced agricultural commodity into a storable 
food product, while firm 2, who may be a foreign firm, converts an imported agricultural 
commodity. The two types of raw agricultural commodity are not necessarily perfect 
substitutes and the processed products may be perfect or imperfect substitutes for each 
other. The equilibrium concept employed is that of Nash equilibrium, each firm setting 
their relevant strategic variable (quantity or price) in order to maximize profits, given the 
action of the rival firm. The technology of food processing is assumed to be one of constant 
returns and the cost structures are similar for both firms. It is also assumed that costs are 
dominated by purchase of the raw agricultural commodity. 
If si is the strategic action of firm i, i = 1, 2, and profits are 7Ti, a set of strategic 
actions is a Nash equilibrium if, for all i and any feasible action si: 
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(1) 
i.e. the set of actions is an equilibrium if neither firm can change its action to increase its 
profits given the action of the other firm. So assuming the firms' profits functions are twice 
differentiable, the first-order condition for a Nash equilibrium is: 
(2) 
where the subscript is the relevant partial derivative of the profits function. The second-
order condition is such that, for a strategic action si = sj, the following holds: 
(3) 
This will be satisfied if each firm's profit function is strictly concave in its own action\ 
consequently (2) will be sufficient for a Nash equilibrium. 
Defining si = Ri(sj) as firm i's best action given that firm j chooses sj, then the first-
order condition (2) can be re-defined as: 
(4) 
where Ri(sj) can be thought of firm i's reaction to sj. Therefore, a Nash equilibrium 
involving the two food firms is a set of actions (sj,si), where: 
(5) 
In equilibrium, each firm sets its strategic variable optimally given the other firm's 
anticipated action, i.e. equilibrium is where the reaction functions of the two firms cross. 
In the subsequent analysis, the interest is in determining the comparative static effects 
of introducing output quotas on the food processing sector. This requires analysis of the 
slope of the reaction functions for different strategic actions by the two firms. The slope of 
firm i's reaction function is obtained by differentiating expression ( 4 ): 
1 See Friedman (1977) for discussion of the conditions sufficient to generate a stable Nash equilibrium. 
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(6) i "'j 
Given concavity of rri, the sign of the slope of the reaction function is determined by the sign 
of the cross partial derivative of firm i's profits with respect to its rival's action, i.e. rr!j· The 
following conditions give the slope of the function: 
(7) If 1t:J > 0, the reaction function is upward sloping 
If 1t:i < 0, the reaction function is downward sloping 
Given (7), the nature of the strategic action adopted by the two firms can be 
considered. If si relates to quantity, then each food firm sets output in order to maximize 
profits, given the anticipated output choice of the other firm. If goods are substitutes, 
quantity competition is usually represented by downward-sloping reaction functions and the 
Nash equilibrium corresponds to the familiar Cournot outcome. If si relates to price, then 
each food firm sets price in order to maximize profits, given the anticipated price choice of 
the other firm. For substitute goods, price competition is normally characterized by upward-
sloping reaction functions and the Nash equilibrium is the Bertrand outcome2• 
2. Comparative Statics and Output Quotas 
Suppose the government chooses either to impose restrictions on food processors themselves 
in order to restrict output in the farm sector, or introduces such a policy in the farm sector 
that, de facto, acts as a direct policy on food processors, i.e. where the raw commodity is 
sufficiently critical in processing that a quota on its output is essentially a quota on the 
processed good's output. 
2 Following the terminology of Bulow, Geankoplos, and Klempercr (1985), when two goods are normal 
substitutes, under Cournot, the goods arc 'strategic substitutes', and under Bertrand, the goods are 'strategic 
complements'. 
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It is assumed that, prior to implementation of the quota, intervention prices and 
import tariffs are already in place. This means that while farmers face a reduction in 
output, they are guaranteed the same price per unit of output. Two policy experiments are 
conducted; first, a quota is placed on the output of the firm processing domestic agricultural 
output; second, a quota is also placed on the processor importing the raw agricultural 
commodity. This could be regarded as a stylization of the UK sugar processing industry, 
where EC sugar beet quotas operate through British Sugar, whilst Tate and Lyle are subject 
to a quota on their imports of cane sugar. The effects of these policies are considered in 
situations where firms initially play a game in quantities and prices respectively. 
Quota placed on Processing of Domestic Agricultural Commodity 
Once quota constraints are introduced into the model, the way firms behave will clearly be 
affected. Where the strategic variable is quantity, a quota on firm 1 has the following 
effects; 
Proposition 1. Given a game in quantities with downward-sloping reaction fu.nctions, 
implementing a quota on firm 1 ~ output: 
(i) Lowers the output of finn 1 and increases that of firm 2 
(ii) Increases food prices if the goods are perfect substitutes 
(iii) Increases the profits of firm 2 at the expense of firm 1 
Proof. 
The proof here is represented in Figure 1, where R1 and R2 are the initial reaction functions 
of the two firms, and N is the initial equilibrium. 
With a quota of x1 imposed on the firm processing the domestic agricultural 
commodity, its reaction function becomes a vertical line at a, and below the quota it is R1• 
For firm 2, it now knows that a quota has been placed on the other firm, hence it will 
choose that level of output, given the quota, that will maximize its profits, i.e. where the iso-
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profit contour 7f 2 is just tangent to the quota constraint at N '. The rest of the proof is 
straightforward; output of firm 1 falls from x1 to x1 and that of firm 2 rises from x2 to x;. 
The price of both goods increases if they are perfect substitutes, otherwise the price effect 
is ambiguous3• Also, the profits of firm 2 increase from 7f 2 to 7f; and those of firm 2 fall 
from 7f 1 to 7f~. 
A, 
x' 
2 
Figure 1 
x, x, 
Essentially, this is the result illustrated in Fung (1989), and can be thought of in 
terms of the quota acting as a credible pre-commitment on the part of firm 1 to decrease 
its output, hence shifting profits to firm 2 in the form of quota rents. In terms of the effects 
on consumers, they lose from higher food prices if the goods are perfect substitutes. 
When the two firms compete in price, a quota imposed on firm 1 has the following 
effects; 
Proposition 2. Wizen price is the strategic variable and reaction functions are upward-sloping, 
implementing an output quota on firm 1 's output: 
(i) Lowers the output of both firms 
3 In the case of perfect substitutes, the predicted price changes follow from the stability conditions for a 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium, i.e. the output of firm 1 falls by more than the increase in firm 2's output because 
R1 is steeper than R2• See Dixit (1986) for further discussion. 
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(ii) Increases the prices of the processed products, although finn 2 will randomize over two 
prices 
(iii) The profits of both jinns increase 
Proof. 
The proof here follows analysis originally suggested by Krishna (1989). Consider Figure 2, 
where R1 and R2 represent the usual reaction functions in a price game, N is the initial 
equilibrium. 
Figure 2 R, 
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Taking a direct demand function, and assuming a quota restraint of x1 is placed on 
firm 1, then the quota will be just binding at prices p1 and p2 if: 
(8) 
This implicitly defines the price p1 that will just satisfy the quota given firm 2's price p2, i.e. 
p1 = f(p2,x1). The set of prices that will satisfy the quota is given by the line i 1i 1 in Figure 
2. This line lies to the right of the no-quota equilibrium as the quota is assumed to be more 
restrictive. At points to the left of xi1, firm l's price is lower than that necessary to satisfy 
the quota, hence the quota is binding. At points to the right of x1i 1, the quota is not 
binding. Hence firm l's reaction function can be defined as: 
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(9) 
Suppose, therefore, that firm 2 charges p2 and firm 1 charges f>i, demand for firm l's 
processed product will exceed the quota. In order to make the quota bind, a rationing rule 
is required. Following Krishna, it is assumed that costless arbitrage4 occurs, whereby 
consumers of firm l's good who are able to purchase at Pi· re-sell at a higher price that 
clears the market, i.e the price necessary for the constraint to be satisfied. Hence, firm 2 
can always make the quota bind by charging a price above the line xii. 
Figure3 
P, 
Given firm l's reaction function under the quota, firm 2's is considered in Figure 3. 
Define two price combinations; (pi,PD where firm 2's iso-profit contour 'ff; is just tangent 
to the quota constraint at g, and (pf ,p~) where 'ff; intersects firm 2's reaction function at h. 
If firm 1 sets a price Pi > p!, then firm 2 does not make the quota bind as it can sell at a 
price along its reaction function hi which generates profits in excess of 'ff;. If Pi < pi, firm 
4 Tirole (1989) describes this as "efficient" rationing in that consumer surplus is maximized. 
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2 will set the price p~ in order to make the quota bind. If p1 = pi, firm 2 is indifferent 
between setting p~ and Pi· 
Consequently, firm 2's reaction fu11ction is discontinuous along the lines hi andjk and 
never intersects firm l's reaction function. Therefore, a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies 
does not exist. As Krishna shows, the mixed strategy equilibrium is one where firm 1 
charges Pi whilst firm 2 randomizes over the prices Pi to p~. In the mixed strategy 
equilibrium, firm l's expected profits rise to the level associated with pi, whilst those of firm 
2 rise to 11";. As equilibrium prices are above (p~,p~), the output of both firms is likely to 
fall. Hence in contrast to a game in quantities, a quota placed on the output of firm 1 
results in both firms acting less competitively and both would have an incentive to maintain 
such a policy. As a result of this policy consumers face higher food prices. 
Quota placed on both Food Processors 
The case of quota constraints on both firms is also considered. It is assumed that the quota 
on firm 2 is similar to that placed on firm 1. In the case of a quantity game, this has the 
following effects; 
Proposition 3. When quantity is the strategic variable and reaction functions are downward-
s/oping, implementing an output quota on both Jinns 1 and 2: 
(i) Lowers the output of both firms 
(ii) The prices of both products will rise 
(iii) The profits of both firms increase, assuming input costs remain at the support price level 
Proof. 
This result is illustrated in Figure 4, where the outputs of both firms are restricted to x1 and 
x2 respectively, and profits rise to 7r; and 7r ;. 
Basically the quotas allow the two firms to act more collusively, although the result 
is dependent on quota symmetry. In terms of welfare, both firms gain by extracting quota 
• 
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rents, the consumer loses from higher food prices and farmers receive the same per unit 
price for a lower level of output. Consequently, both firms would have an incentive to 
maintain/increase the level of output quotas. 
x 
2 
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2 
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When output quotas are imposed on both firms in the case of a game in price, the 
following results hold; 
Proposition 4. Given an initial game in price and upward-sloping reaction functions, 
implementing quotas on firms 1 and 2: 
(i) Lowers the output of both jinns 
(ii) Increases the prices of the processed products 
(iii) The profits of both Jinns increase 
Proof. 
This result is illustrated in Figure 5 where x1x1 is the quota constraint on firm 1 and x2x2 is 
the corresponding constraint for firm 2. It is assumed that these restrictions are symmetric. 
Above x1x1 and below x2x2, the quotas are binding on firms 1 and 2 respectively. 
A Nash equilibrium in prices is sought in this game. Given Proposition 2, firm 1 does 
not set a price below Pi as firm 2 will always set p~ in order to make the quota bind. 
Similarly for firm 2, it knows that setting a price below Pi will result in firm 1 setting p~ in 
• 
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order for the quota to bind on firm 2. Consequently, neither firm sets a price below the set 
(pi,pi). Therefore, each firm chooses a price to maximize profits where its quota will just 
bind given the other firm is bound by its quota constraint, i.e. (pi,pi), which implies a pure 
strategy equilibrium at points d,d' 5, with the associated profit levels.,,.~ and.,,.~. Hence the 
welfare effects of quotas on both food processors are unambiguous, the prices and profits 
of both firms increase and output of both firms falls. The consumer faces higher prices for 
processed food products. 
P* 2 
Figure 5 
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In concluding this discussion, Propositions 3 and 4 can be synthesized by recognizing 
that output quotas have the same effect as capacity constraints in a two-stage game, where 
in the first period, capacities are chosen and in the second, prices are set to satisfy these 
capacities. Kreps and Scheinkman have shown that when firms are capacity constrained in 
a price game, the prices they set are those that would be generated by the Walrasian 
auctioneer in a one-stage quantity game. This result is driven by the assumption of the 
efficient rationing rule, which is the same as that employed in the analysis above. 
s This is a stable equilibrium because in a symmetric game, there is no price wedge over which 
consumers can arbitrage, i.e. there is no need for rationing. 
• 
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Consequently, Proposition 4 can be seen as generating Cournot-equivalent prices for the 
processed food products, i.e. the equilibrium with quotas is the same for both quantity and 
price strategies6• 
3. Summary 
The aim of this paper has been to consider how sensitive the outcomes of agricultural and 
food policy are to the underlying game being played by food processors. Using the example 
of output restrictions in a duopoly market structure, it has been shown that when a 
restriction is placed on only one firm, both benefit when they compete in price, while the 
other firm benefits when competition is in quantities. When restrictions are imposed on 
both firms, they benefit under both price and quantity competition, the effect being exactly 
similar under efficient rationing. Consumers clearly lose under all of these policy 
experiments and in three cases it would seem that food processing firms have an incentive 
to encourage government to maintain the restrictions. By assumption, farmers in all cases 
receive the same per unit price for the raw commodity at a lower level of output. 
It might be argued that these results have been restricted to Cournot and Bertrand 
behavior. However, they are the logical Nash equilibria in one-shot, simultaneous move 
games, nonetheless, other oligopoly equilibria such as Stackelberg leadership could be 
examined. Different forms of behavior, other types of policy and empirical assessment can 
be considered as part of future research in this area. 
6 It should be noted that Davidson and Dencckere (1986) have shown that for other rationing rules, the 
Cournot outcome does not necessarily emerge. 
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